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Chee-Ruey Hsieh1 and Chengxiang Tang2,3*Abstract
Background: Medical education is critical and the first step to foster the competence of a physician. Unlike
developed countries, China has been adopting a system of multi-tiered medical education to training physicians,
which is featured by the provision of an alternative lower level of medical practitioners, or known as a feldsher
system since the 1950s. This study aimed to illustrate the impact of multi-tiered medical education on both the
equity in the delivery of health care services and the efficiency of the health care market.
Methods: Based on both theoretical reasoning and empirical analysis, this paper documented evidence upon those
impacts of the medical education system.
Results: First, the geographic distribution of physicians in China is not uniform across physicians with different
educational training. Second, we also find the evidence that high-educated doctors are more likely to be hired by
larger hospitals, which in turn add the fuel to foster the hospital-center health care system in China as patients
choose large hospitals to chase good doctors. Third, through the channels of adverse selection and moral hazard,
the heterogeneity in medical education also imposes costs to the health care market in China.
Discussion: Overall, the three-tiered medical education system in China is a standard policy trade-off between
quantity and quality in training health care professionals. On the one hand, China gains the benefit of increasing
the supply of health care professionals at lower costs. On the other hand, China pays the price for keeping a multi-
tiered medical education in terms of increasing inequality and efficiency loss in the health care sector. Finally, we
discuss the potential policy options for China to mitigate the negative impact of keeping a multi-tiered medical
education on the performance of health care market.
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Physicians are the captains of the health care team, indi-
cating that whether physicians are competent has an
important implication on the quality of health care
services. Medical education is the first step to foster the
competence of a physician, although learning by doing
(on-the-job training) and other channels such as
continuing education are also important to assure that
physicians remain competent. In most high-income
countries, physicians are a homogeneous group in that© The Author(s). 2019 Open Access This artic
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ter where they practice. In China, however, physicians
are heterogeneous in that physicians differ in their edu-
cational training. Some receive full training in their med-
ical professional education program while others only
receive a short or partial training; hereafter, we refer to
this as the multi-tiered medical education system.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the potential
impacts of the multi-tiered medical education system
from the perspective of health economics. Specifically,
we investigate the effects of the multi-tiered medical
education system on the performance of health care
market in terms of equity and efficiency. We address
two research questions: first, to what extent that thele is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
ive appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
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in the delivery of health care services in China, and
second, what kind of costs, in terms of both equity and
efficiency, that China needs to pay for maintaining such
a multi-tiered medical education system.
This study contains the following sections. In the next
section, we first provide an institutional background on
China’s medical education system. The key institutional
feature is that China has adopted a multi-tiered education
system to train physicians after since the 1950s. The
“Methods” section demonstrated the analysis strategy and
empirical methods. The “Results” section revealed the
long-term impacts of medical system on the performance
of health care market. The “Discussion” section docu-
mented the pros and cons of the medical education sys-
tem, provided explanations from economic perspectives,
and discussed mitigation policies. The final part presents a
summary of the major findings and contributions.
Institutional background
Overview
In China, there are substantial differences in the quality
of medical education due to the existence of a three-tier
education program. The first tier is degree-oriented
medical education or bachelor program which includes
5 years of undergraduate medical studies followed by 3
years of residence. The second tier is still a tertiary med-
ical education, or called junior medical colleges which
provide 3 years of study after high school and lead to a
vocational diploma. The third tier is a secondary-level
medical education, or named secondary vocational
schools which provide very limited medical training after
junior middle school and lead to a secondary vocational
diploma (SVD) [1–4]. Some doctors may receive a mas-
ter or doctoral degree by extending the year of their
training after the undergraduate study. For simplicity,
we combine these two groups of doctors into the group
of bachelor degree and refer them as a group of “bach-
elor degree or above.”
The current law allows medical graduates with a non-
bachelor degree to become assistant doctors, and then
they have the chance to obtain the full doctor licensure
after they accumulate certain years of work experience
and pass an examination [3, 4]. Thus, at a given point in
time, the pool of Chinese physicians contains three types
of physicians with different levels of education training;
hereafter, we refer to these variations in education training
across doctors as heterogeneity of medical education.
We further differentiate two types of heterogeneity in
physicians in China from perspective of health econom-
ics, because, in the milestone paper of health economics,
Arrow reported that four variables are deemed most
important in the market of physicians: price of physi-
cians (or wage rate of physicians), quantity of physicians,quality of entering medical students, and quality of
medical education [5]. It is for certain that at least two
critical variables, both the quality of entering students
and quality of medical programs, substantially varied.
First, medical students admitted to the bachelor pro-
gram and junior medical college program are signifi-
cantly different in terms of their quality. Like many
other countries, graduates from high school who attempt
to receive tertiary level education need to take the
national college entrance examination (NCEE); however,
those scores for bachelor programs in medicine are
much higher than that for junior medical colleges. For
example, only students who basically rank top 40% in
NCEE have admissions into medical bachelor programs
for the whole country, so junior medical colleges have to
recruit from students ranked below 40% in NCEE [6].
Second, students who attend secondary vocational
schools out of junior middle school have only a mini-
mum 9 years of basic education, which brings about the
quality problem of the entering students on the one
hand; those secondary vocational schools in medicine
generally offer limited and tailored courses to meet de-
mands of those students on the other hand.
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of physicians by
education level between 2002 and 2014. Although the
share of physicians with bachelor degree or above has
increased over time, from 28% in 2002 to 48% in
2014, there are still more than half of physicians in
China who do not receive the full entry-level medical
training according to the current international stand-
ard. Entry-level medical education programs are
tertiary-level courses undertaken at a medical school.
Depending on jurisdiction and university, these may
be either undergraduate-entry (most of Europe, Asia,
South America, and Oceania) or graduate-entry pro-
grams (mainly Australia, North America); therefore,
gaining a basic medical degree may take from 5 to 8
or even 9 years (please refer to: https://www.who.int/
hrh/education/en/).
To be specific, in 2014, 48% of physicians in China
possess a bachelor degree or above, 31% of physicians re-
ceived medical training through junior medical colleges,
and about one in every five physicians only received
medical education through a much-abbreviated training
program (SVD). The substantial variations in the years of
medical education program across physicians in China
suggest that the Chinese doctors are not a homogenous
group. Rather, they are substantially heterogeneous in that
one doctor is not the same as the other doctor in terms of
quality of enrolled students and educational training.
Historical perspective on physicians’ supply
Given the fact that more than half of currently practicing
physicians in China do not receive sufficient education
Fig. 1 China’s doctors and assistant doctors by education level, 2002–2014. Sources: Health Statistical Yearbook of China (various years). Notes: (1)
Data for 2003–2004 and 2006–2008 are not available. (2) Bachelor or above refers to the category that doctors have educational achievement
high than a bachelor degree, including bachelor, master, and doctorate degrees. Vocational diploma refers to a junior college degree (Zhuan Ke)
or a junior tertiary education, generally including 3-year post high school education; secondary vocational diploma or below refers to both
secondary vocational diploma (Zhong Zhuan) and high school education
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this is a short-run or long-run phenomenon. If this is a
short-run phenomenon, the heterogeneity of medical
education is not a big concern as the current situation
will be phased out very soon. By contrast, the heterogen-
eity of medical education in China is a serious public
concern if this is a long-run phenomenon in that the
physicians who do not receive the sufficient education
training will persistently prevail in the market in a
significant share. In order to address this question, we
need to first look at the evolution of medical education
in China (Table 1) and then to have more information
on the annual number of enrolled medical students,
medical graduates, and newly licensed physicians.
After the communist revolution, China followed the
Soviet model of medical education, which highlighted
both independent medical schools and a feldsher practi-
tioners system. Feldsher is derived from the German
Feldscher, which was coined in the fifteenth century. In
the eighteenth century, the term was then exported with
Prussian officers to Russia. There is clear evidence on
the relationship between physicians and feldsher; how-
ever, no evidence shows that feldshers will gradually
disappear while physicians with “formal” medical train-
ing are increasing in numbers [7]. In the vast majority of
former Soviet countries, feldsher provides primary,obstetric, and surgical care services in rural and remote
areas, which featured by a secondary-level medical edu-
cation with a rather shorter period of training than the
standard MD program.
The upper panel of Fig. 2 shows the overtime pattern
in the number of medical graduates from secondary and
tertiary medical schools during 1950 and 1980. Before
1980, the supply of medical students from tertiary school
(university/college) had been only half of those students
from secondary school for the most of period, with an
exception between years 1963 and 1965. Before the
market-oriented reform, China implemented a central
planning economy, in which medical students obtain
health care job by rationing entry. Therefore, the huge
supply of middle-level medical students forms the ma-
jority of doctors before 1980. Even up to 2002, those
doctors who only had secondary-level training in med-
ical education still account for 41% of all doctors in
China (see Fig. 1).
In the lower panel of Fig. 2, we depict the time trend
of the number of enrolled medical students by educa-
tion level from 1985 to 2014. It seems that China’s
government realized that the previous model of medical
education system cannot be sustainable; the govern-
ment attempted to shut off the secondary education for
medical professionals since 2011. From 2011 and so on,
Table 1 The evolution of medical education in China
Time period Events (major contents of education reform)
1949 Adopted the Soviet model of autonomous medical
universities.
1966–1976 Culture revolution: medical education was disrupted.
1998 Introducing education reform that stand-alone medical
institutions and schools were merged into
comprehensive universities.
2009 The government adopted a reform plan that aims to
phasing-out 3-year medical program at secondary level.
2013 The government initiated a plan to “standardize” the
quality of medical education by launching a new
system called 5+3: 5-year undergraduate study
plus 3-year residency.
Hsieh and Tang Human Resources for Health           (2019) 17:50 Page 4 of 13the number of enrolled medical students by tertiary
institutions began to surpass those from secondary
education. Along with the transition from a rationing
entry system to a market with licensed practicing, it is
becoming extremely difficult for medical students with
only secondary-level training to be doctors, even
though some secondary medical programs (secondary
diploma, e.g. in rural medicine, TCM, and medicine of
ethnic minorities) still exist and can be allowed to get
practice license after examination. A particular policy
needs to be pointed out is that a 5-year medical
program after junior middle school was started and
boosted from 2004 across western China, but was abol-
ished in 2014 [8, 9].Fig. 2 Time trend of medical graduates by education level, 1950–1980, and
Health Statistical Yearbook of China (various years)Health care and medical education reform
During the last two decades, the government in China
proposed two waves of major health care reform and
followed corresponding medical education reform
(Table 1). The first wave of reform started in 1998,
which aimed to merge those independent medical insti-
tutions and colleges into comprehensive universities and
thus expanded medical graduates rapidly to address pro-
fession shortage [10]. Due to the national health reform
initialized in 2009, the ministry of education and minis-
try of health launched a comprehensive reform on med-
ical education to improve both the distribution and
enhance the quality of health workforce in 2012 [11].
Different from the 1998 reform, the principal objective
of the 2012 reform is to improve the quality of doctors
instead of increasing the quantity of human resources
for health. The assignments of the second reform since
2012 include implementing physician education and
training program of excellence, the establishment of
accreditation system of medical program among univer-
sities, and the merge of professional master degree
(master of medicine, MM) program and standardized
residency training (SRT). The excellence plan is to build
a common schedule for clinical doctors, called 5+3, in
which 5 years of undergraduate medical education
combined with 3 years of SRT will become a minimum
requirement for a future practicing physician in China.
The major progress of the latest reform is that the gov-
ernment aimed at eliminating 3-year medical programsenrolled medical students by education level, 1985–2014. Source:
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trated by the lower panel of Fig. 2. However, the disad-
vantage of the reform is that the government still
discriminately supplies heterogeneous medical profes-
sions, e.g., medical graduates from 3-year tertiary voca-
tional diploma, which are deemed as the mainstream
source of rural health workforce.
The major progress of the current reform is to
eliminate the medical programs in secondary-level edu-
cation, so the major impact of the current reform is the
shrinkage of stock of physicians with only secondary-
vocational medical training. This effect was reflected by
the change of educational distribution of newly licensed
physicians during the past decade [12]. In specific,
according to the data obtained from The National
Center for Medical Examination in China, we investigate
the changing pattern of the distribution of newly
licensed physicians by education level between 2005 and
2015 (Fig. 3). For all data obtained from The National
Center for Medical Examination, we excluded physicians
whose education background cannot be identified, which
only account for a very small part of the annual total
number (< 0.1%). During this decade, the share of new
physicians with middle education level (3-year college)
remained almost constant in the range of 35 to 36%.
However, the share of new physicians with only high
school degree decreased substantially, from 33% in 2005
to 17% in 2015. By contrast, the share of newly licensed
physicians with a bachelor degree or above increased
from 32% in 2005 to 47% in 2015.Fig. 3 Educational distribution of newly licensed physicians, 2005–2015. SoMethods
Although China has initiated several rounds of reform in
its medical education system, we need to explore
whether doctors with different educational trainings will
still coexist for a long time if the heterogeneity of med-
ical education system in China has almost remained
unchanged. We then analyze the effect of heterogeneity
in medical education on the equity of health care. We
further explore the impact of heterogeneity in medical
education on the efficiency of health care market.
Projection on growth of the medical practitioners
Based on the statistical description and the same data
reported in both Figs. 2 and 3, we further predict the
supply trend of newly licensed physicians during 2015–
2035. We made four key assumptions in calculating the
annual number of new supplied physicians in the follow-
ing two decades. First, a total attrition rate in the med-
ical practitioners is 3% a year for each year of the next
20 years. Second, we assume a consistent age structure
among three educational groups. Third, it is reasonable
to assume that total annual supplied number remains
the same, because the government also aims to improve
the quality of medical education and control for the
quantity in the meantime according to the current policy
[9, 13]. Fourth, the number of newly licensed doctors
equal to the number of new hiring.
We manipulated our analysis by two scenarios. In
scenario 1, we assume that supply structure stays the
same as in 2015. In scenario 2, we assume that theurce: National Center for Medical Examination in China (various years)
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year SVD program; specifically, the ratio of new physi-
cians in SVD level decreases by 1% for every year, while
the ratio of new physicians in bachelor or above level
increases by 1% for each year.
The impact on equity
In our analysis, we define equity in terms of equal access
to “good” doctors, which in turn is measured by whether
they received good education training. The question we
would like to explore is whether individuals living in
different areas have equal access to good doctors. We
first use the aggregate statistic at national level to show
the distribution of physicians by regions and by educa-
tion levels. We then use the individual data to show the
effect of education level on the physician’s practicing
location between the urban and rural sector. Our data
was collected from a provincial survey of human re-
sources for healthcare conducted between August and
October 2009 that is a part of an overall investigation of
the health system for the purpose of health sector re-
form in Fujian province (please refer to the cited paper
for socio-demographic characteristics of the individual
data). All human resources working for health organiza-
tions in Fujian province until 31 December 2008 were
included as participants; therefore, this is almost a
population-based dataset rather a sample selection [14].
In specific, we estimated a logistic regression model in
the first column, and then, we estimated a fixed effects
model in the second column. In the models, the
dependent variable refers to a binary variable indicating
the urban (= 1) and rural (= 0) settings for the hospitals,
while independent variable “higher education” indicates
three levels of education that is consistent through our
study: secondary vocational diploma or below (= 1), col-
lege diploma (= 2), and bachelor or above (= 3). Rather
than attempt to control for a multitude of county-level
factors, we utilize county-level fixed effects. This absorbs
factors that are time-invariant but that are likely to affect
practice location, for example, physicians in counties
with higher GDP are more likely to practice in rural
area, or have high level of education.
The impact on efficiency
First, we define the concept of efficiency. We analyzed
the whole market included both demand side (patients)
and supply side (physicians) by incorporating their inter-
actions and dynamics. We refer the efficiency as the
allocative efficiency which implies the optimal mix of
outputs that achieves the goal of maximizing social
welfare or health gain, which in turn is described by the
right (optimal) point on production possibility frontier.
In other words, allocative inefficiency is reduced if we
alter the mix of services that the health system producesso that more health gains or higher social welfare can be
achieved from a given resource endowment. For more
information on economic efficiency, two cited papers
can provide more perspectives [15, 16].
In this part, we will also utilize both theoretical
reasoning and empirical analysis, to document evidence
on the potential impact of heterogeneity in medical
education on the efficiency of health care sector from
three perspectives: (1) patients, (2) physicians, and (3)
the system. In the empirical study, we still use the data-
set of human resources for healthcare collected from
Fujian province in 2009 to analyze the relationship be-
tween education level and the distribution of physician
practice location among hospitals with various sizes. The
hospital size in China has four clearly ranked categories,
so we used an ordered probit analysis.
Results
Projection on growth of the medical practitioners
Figure 4 reports the result of our prediction on the
distribution of practicing physicians by education level
between 2015 and 2035. The result shows that the share
of physicians with a bachelor degree or above will
increase over time, from 47% in 2015 to 54% in 2035.
Although the proportion of physicians with only SVD
training decreases over time, from 21% in 2015 to 11%
in 2035, the physicians with vocational diploma still ac-
count for about one third of total number of practicing
physicians in China. Putting together, even in 2035, phy-
sicians without bachelor degree still account for 46% of
total number of practicing physicians, which indicates
that the heterogeneity in China’s medical education is a
long-run phenomenon and will not phase out over time.
Thus, it is important to further investigate the impact of
the heterogeneity in medical education on the equity
and efficiency of health care market in China.
The impact on equity
Given the evidence that there are three types of physi-
cians (in terms of education training) in China, it is
important to investigate whether the distribution of phy-
sicians across regions in China is correlated to the varia-
tions in physician’s education. There is an important
implication for the equity in the delivery of health care
service if physicians with better education training are
more likely to concentrate in certain areas, such as
urban areas or high-income cities.
As shown in Table 2, in 2005, near half of physicians
who work in urban hospitals have a bachelor degree or
above. This ratio increased to near two thirds in 2014.
By contrast, in 2005, only about 4% of physicians who
practices in rural township hospitals own a bachelor de-
gree or above. This ratio increased to 11.9% in 2014.
Putting together, this result suggests that physicians in
Fig. 4 Predicted stock change of physicians by education level, 2010–2035. Notes: (1) The change of education structure is predicted based on scenario 2
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training in their medical education while physicians in
rural sector are more likely to receive a low-quality
medical training.
The results from Table 3 show that all coefficients for
age and gender are statistically insignificant at 1% level
in the model (2). Compared to vocational diploma,
respondents who had bachelor degree were found to be
19 (OR = 19.591, 95% CI = 17.809–21.552) times more
likely to be associated with practicing in urban area.
While compared to vocational diploma, respondents
who had college diploma were found to be nearly threeTable 2 Distribution of doctors (including assistant doctors) by educ
Educational level Urban hospitals (%)
2005
Bachelor or above 47.2
Vocational diploma 32.2
Secondary vocational diploma or below 20.6
Sources: Health Statistical Yearbook of China 2006 and 2015(OR = 2.699, 95% CI = 2.516–2.895) times more likely to
be associated with practicing in urban area. Using the
survey data obtained from Fujian province, the multi-
variate analysis indicates that physicians who have edu-
cational achievement higher than a bachelor degree are
more likely to choose urban areas as the location of their
practices, after controlling for all other variables.
Taken together, our results indicate that the hetero-
geneity in physician education training deteriorates the
degree of geographical maldistribution of physicians
across regions in China. As observed in other countries,
rural areas tend to have lower physician density (numberation level in 2005 and 2014
Rural township hospitals (%)
2014 2005 2014
65.7 3.9 11.9
24.1 28.8 42.5
10.2 67.3 45.6
Table 3 Regression analysis of the physician’s choice on the practice location between urban and rural areas
Dependent variable Logit model: urban (= 1) vs. rural (= 0)
(1) Odds ratio (2) Odds ratio
Higher education
College diploma (dummy) 2.748*** [2.581, 2.926] 2.699*** [2.516, 2.895]
Bachelor degree or above (dummy) 34.480*** [31.665, 37.546] 19.591*** [17.809, 21.552]
Age 1.043*** [1.040, 1.047] 1.040*** [1.037, 1.043]
Male 0.435*** [0.408, 0.464] 0.474*** [0.441, 0.509]
Fixed effects County
Number of observations 36 674 36 674
Log-likelihood function − 1.59e+04 − 1.34e+04
Chi squared 10 950.468*** 3 824.568***
Pseudo R-squared 0.257 0.356
BIC 31 759.125 26 834.060
Source: 2009 Fujian province database is a cross-sectional database that collected basic characteristics of human resources for health in all of the health institutes
Exponentiated coefficients are presented in the table; confidence intervals in parentheses
*** denote statistical significance at the 1% levels
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Figure 5 provides supporting evidence that the time
trend of physician density in both urban and rural areas
in China has been increasing from 2005 to 2015, while
the number for the rural area has never been greater
than 2, compared to that for the urban area ranging
from 2.5 to 3.8. However, in China, the situation is
getting worse in that there is a double disparity between
rural and urban areas in the geographic maldistribution
of physicians. Rural areas not only possess a disadvan-
tage in terms of quantity (i.e., low physician density), but
also have a disadvantage in terms of quality. That is,
most well-educated physicians (with a bachelor degreeFig. 5 Time trend of physicians’ density between urban and rural area, 200or above) are concentrated in urban areas. Only a few
well-educated physicians choose their practices in rural
areas. As a result, the heterogeneity in medical education
adds the fuels into the fire to amplify China’s regional in-
equality in health care. That is, rural and urban residents
do not have an equal access to well-educated physicians.
The impact on efficiency
In Table 4, the regressions use the hospital accreditation
level as a proxy of hospital size, as in China hospital
accreditation level is precisely based on the hospital size.
Dependent variable refers to an indicator variable for
small-level (= 1), fair-level (= 2), big-level (= 3), and5–2015. Source: Health Statistical Yearbook of China (various years)
Table 4 Regression analysis of the physician’s choice on the practice location between large and small hospitals
Dependent variable Ordered probit model: hospital size
(1) (2)
Higher education
College diploma (dummy) 0.513*** (0.017) 0.559*** (0.022)
Bachelor degree or above (dummy) 1.759*** (0.016) 1.717*** (0.027)
Age 0.018*** (0.001) 0.019*** (0.001)
Male − 0.381*** (0.013) − 0.406*** (0.022)
Cut1 Constant 0.590*** (0.029) − 24.252 (596.049)
Cut2 Constant 1.860*** (0.030) − 19.456 (596.048)
Cut3 Constant 3.012*** (0.032) − 5.556 (576.072)
Fixed effects COUNTY
Number of observations 36 674 36 674
Log-likelihood function − 4.03e+04 − 1.25e+04
Chi squared 14 936.433*** 70 457.985***
Pseudo R-squared 0.156 0.738
BIC 80 659.477 26 115.339
Source: 2009 Fujian province database is a cross-sectional database that collected basic characteristics of human resources for health in all of the health institutes
*** denote statistical significance at the 1% levels. standard errors are reported in the parentheses
cut1—this is the estimated cutpoint on the latent variable used to differentiate township-level hospital from county-level, city-level, and provincial-level hospitals
when values of the predictor variables are evaluated at zero
cut2—this is the estimated cutpoint on the latent variable used to differentiate township-level and county-level hospital from city-level and provincial-level
hospitals when values of the predictor variables are evaluated at zero
cut3—this is the estimated cutpoint on the latent variable used to differentiate township-level, county-level, and city-level hospitals from provincial level hospitals
when values of the predictor variables are evaluated at zero
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tions in China, they are categorized into four levels
based on the organization size or the number of beds:
township-level (number of beds, 1–20), county-level
(number of beds 20–99), city-level (number of beds
100–499), and provincial-level (number of beds > 500)
[17]. The independent variable we are concerned is still
the “higher education”. The model (2) in the second col-
umn is still a model with county-level fixed effects.
As shown in Table 4, the intercept parameters are sig-
nificantly different from each other so the four categor-
ies should not be combined into one. As observed in the
education gradient between rural and urban areas, there
is also an obvious education gradient in the distribution
of physicians across health institutions. The results show
that physicians who have education achievements higher
than bachelor degree are more likely to practice in larger
hospitals, after controlling for other variables (Table 4).
Discussion
It will be a little bit ambitious to compare this study with
the Flexner Report, an epoch-making study of medical
education in the United States of America, written by
Abraham Flexner and published in 1910 [18]. Our study,
however, illustrated a similar story that was depicted and
criticized by the Flexner Report a century ago. The fun-
damental message between two studies is that too manymedical schools established and too many “doctors”
trained, with significantly different admission and gradu-
ation standards. Our contribution is that we first pointed
out the three-tier medical education program in China is
a standard policy trade-off between quantity and quality
in training health care professionals.
The advantage of such an education system is to
increase the quantity of physicians supplied but at the
expense of quality in education training. The previous
researches pay more attention to the benefits of adopt-
ing a multi-tiered medical education system to the
improvement of population health in the pre-reform era,
such as the public health contribution of barefoot doc-
tors to the decrease of mortality rate in China [19]. By
contrast, little attention has been rigorously paid to the
costs that the society pays by adopting a multi-tiered
medical education system, especial for the post-reform
era that China has experienced an epidemiologic transi-
tion from communicable to non-communicable diseases
(NCDs). Our paper fills this gap by analyzing the impact
of heterogeneity in medical education on both efficiency
and equity in the delivery of health care system in China.
Our analysis yields three important findings.
First, the geographic distribution of physicians in
China is not uniform across physicians with different
education training. We find the evidence that high-
educated doctors are more likely to practice in urban
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tice in rural areas. A number of evidence in both China
and international show physicians’ human capital is most
strongly associated with bad health outcomes through the
mechanism of poor diagnosis decision [20–22]. Given that
high-educated doctors are in a better position to provide
high-quality health care, the concentration of high-
educated physicians in urban areas indicates that there is
an inequality in the delivery of health care services
between rural and urban areas in that rural residents are
in a disadvantage position to receive the high-quality
health care services.
Second, we also find the evidence that high-educated
doctors are more likely to be hired by larger hospitals,
which in turn add the fuel to foster the hospital-center
health care system in China as patients choose large
hospitals to chase good doctors. However, chasing good
doctors in large hospitals has a price to pay: deteriorat-
ing the trust relationship between patients and their
doctors. This is because the large patient volumes put
patients in a very difficult position to build the long-
term relationship with their doctors.
Third, the heterogeneity in medical education also
creates both adverse selection and moral hazard to the
health care market in China. On the one hand, the
heterogeneous education system deters the entry of
high-competent doctors into the health care market as
the regulated market only pay the average salary to all
doctors, and hence, good doctors do not receive a good
pay. On the other hand, the heterogeneity in medical
education deters the incentive for continuing education
and new investment on human capitals among the exist-
ing doctors as the rate of return of such an investment
is low, which in turn removes incentives to develop
credentials or qualifications.
Perspectives from economic theories
In this subsection, we further discuss the impact of
heterogeneity in medical education on the efficiency of
health care sector from three perspectives: (1) patients,
(2) physicians, and (3) the system.
From the patients’ perspective, the heterogeneity in
medical education imposes additional search and infor-
mational costs to seek for good doctors. China, like
many other Asian countries including Japan and South
Korea, has a closed-staff hospital system whereby physi-
cians practicing in hospitals are employees of hospitals
[23]. In addition, few physicians in China practice in
their own clinics. Given the fact that public hospitals
and other public health institutions account for about
90% of market share in China’s health sector, physicians
serving as state employees are just similar to civil
servants who in turn are subject to several government
regulations, such as headcount quota and the link ofphysician licensing with employed institutions. As a
result, physicians are restricted to have the mobility
opportunity across health institutions.
Due to the asymmetric information in health care
market, patients often do not possess full information to
know who good doctors are. Rather, according to our
results reported at Tables 3 and 4, patients only have
limited information to know that good doctors (as
measured by sufficient education training) are in large
hospitals and in urban sectors. Thus, patients need to
incur two additional costs to find a good doctor: search
cost and time cost. Search cost is also called the cost of
frictional market that has been extensively studied by
the search and matching theory [24, 25]. In the theory,
any patient exercising rational efforts keeps on searching
for better physicians till the moment that extra cost of
searching is less than the marginal benefits which the
physician provides. Search cost consists of external and
internal costs [26]. External costs refer to the monetary
costs of searching the quality information provided by
physicians and the opportunity cost of searching time.
Internal costs refer to mental efforts of quality informa-
tion searching, sorting, and integration. Undoubtedly, a
market with heterogeneous physicians will significantly
increase the search cost, as no minimum quality assur-
ance guarantee exists in the market.
Since patients need to spend more time to chase good
doctors, which in turn imposes a higher “time costs” to
the patients and their family. This incentive in turn
creates a hospital-centered health system in China as
good doctors are locked in larger hospitals located in
urban areas. As a result, the associated time costs spent
on searching for and get access to good doctors in larger
hospitals, such as additional time costs allocated to
travel and long waiting time, are efficiency loss in
China’s health system.
In addition, the hospital-centered health system put
patients in a difficult position to build the trust and
long-term relationship with their doctors. This is
because higher search cost will definitely yield higher
transaction costs, in which one of the most serious
results is patients’ low trust in physicians. Low trust is
sometimes considered as the biggest threat to physician-
patient relationships. As the time cost is very high to get
access to doctors in larger hospitals, especially for
patients coming from the rural areas, the patient-
physician relationship is just like “one-time buyers”
instead of “repeat customers.” Furthermore, given the high
patient volumes in larger hospitals, physicians only can
spend a very short time with each patient. Taken together,
chasing a good doctor in larger hospitals end up with the
attenuation of the trust relationship between patients and
physicians, as observed by the increasing number of
medical malpractice litigations in recent years [27]. To
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cians in turn adopt the strategy of defensive medicines,
such as over prescription [28], which also end up with
rising health care cost and imposing the efficiency loss to
the health care system.
From the perspective of physicians, the heterogeneity
of medical education imposes two types of efficiency loss
to health care market: adverse selection and moral haz-
ard. According to the model developed by Akerlof in
1970s, high-quality doctors will not enter the market if
patients do not observe physician’s ability that only
physician knows and physicians’ fees will not depend on
the quality of services [15]. There is an efficiency loss in
terms of the reduction in social welfare when the quacks
prevail in the market and the average quality of health
care decreases. It is reasonable that the case is especially
serious for a market in full of physicians with heteroge-
neous education training.
Shapiro assumes service quality derives directly from
endogenous human capital investment on the one hand
and affects physicians’ reputations on the other hand
[16]. There is a quality deterioration effect if asymmetric
information on the investment between physician and
patient exists in the market. Specifically, the quality
services will be primarily undersupplied because of the
imperfect reputation mechanism or moral hazard prob-
lems among heterogeneous physicians.
In addition, health care market is generally a twofold
market with an upstream market, the physicians market,
and a downstream market, the market for delivering
health care services. Therefore, the cost of upstream mar-
ket will be transmitted to the downstream market [29]. In
this case, we assume low-quality doctors have a smaller
market share or allocation size than high-quality doctors,
e.g., smaller number of inpatient workloads among low-
quality doctors. Then, the group of quack doctors due to
physicians’ heterogeneity in training which in turn have
strong motivations to provide a large amount of unneces-
sary health care through physician induced demand in-
stead of appropriate diagnoses and treatments. Essentially,
it is still the cost due to asymmetric information as
mentioned in the third stream of costs; however, it is
slightly different from the above as this kind of cost
mainly focuses on the health service provision.
From the perspective of health system as a whole, the
heterogeneity in medical education distorted the spe-
cialty mix in health care market, which in turn leads to a
higher cost of health service delivery. A series of studies
have shown that competent primary care providers can
enhance the performance of the health care system as a
whole [30, 31]. The heterogeneity of physicians substan-
tially worsens the specialty mix because physicians with
higher education are more likely to be specialists in
hospitals. As a result, the shrinkage of doctors at theprimary care setting combined with low human capital
deteriorates the human resources for primary health. In
addition, when the “low-quality” GP cannot act their role
in the division of labor, the search costs further increase
due to a lack of information on “gate-keeper” of health
care system.
The options of mitigation policy
Taken together, the heterogeneity of medical education in
China has a strong negative impact on the performance of
health sector in terms of reducing equity and efficiency.
Since it will take a long time for China to achieve the uni-
form quality standard in medical education, it is important
to seek for other policy options to mitigate the current
negative impacts arising from the heterogeneous educa-
tion system for medical doctors. Based on the abovemen-
tioned theoretical reason and empirical evidence, we
discuss several policy options as follows.
It is obvious that the current “The Law for Licensing
Medical Practitioner” issued in 1999 needs to be
modified. The law allows medical graduates with non-
bachelor degree to become assistant doctors, and then,
they have the chance to obtain the full doctor licensure
after they accumulate certain years of work experience
and pass an examination. Our study recommended to
policymakers to adopt the globally agreed-upon
definition of the doctor/physician and to restrict its
occupational regulation. The latest version of the Inter-
national Labor Organization’s International Standard
Classification of Occupations (ISCO) is published in
2012 (ISCO-08) (please see section #221: Medical doctor
in page 125, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/
%2D%2D-dgreports/%2D%2D-dcomm/%2D%2D-publ/
documents/publication/wcms_172572.pdf).
As there is significant disparity in doctors’ education
training between rural and urban areas as well as
between large and small hospitals, it is beneficial to
establish a learning health system that doctors with low
education attainment can learn from doctors with high
education attainment. This is technically feasible by
adopting the health information and communication tech-
nology to integrate doctors in different locations and dif-
ferent institutions into a learning network. This learning
network provides a platform to close the knowledge gap
between rural and urban areas as well as between large
and small hospitals. Specifically, physicians in rural and/or
small hospitals can learn from physicians in urban and/or
large hospitals through the development of clinical path-
way, evidence-based care, and tele-medicine.
In addition, it has been widely recognized that reforming
payment system is the key to increase the efficiency of the
health care system [32]. Current payment system in China
is a volume-based, which rewards physicians according to
the volume of health care services they provided, such as
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sions, and number of prescription drugs, instead of the
outcomes they achieved. During the past decades, many
countries have adopted a series of reform package to
transform their payment system from the traditional
volume-based to value-based [33]. The value-based pay-
ment system emphasizes the value, which is defined as
health outcomes for the money spent, and is in a better
position to reward the good doctors than the traditional
volume-based payment system as the value-based payment
system provides powerful incentive to encourage physician
to value better outcome instead of valuing quantity of
services [34]. Under the traditional payment system, many
quality aspects of health care services, such as time,
diligence, care, and attentiveness, are not reimbursed by
the payer [32]. By contrast, physicians’ additional efforts
and time inputs as well as additional education training,
which are strongly related to outcome, are reimbursed by
the payer under the value-based payment system. Thus,
good doctors who emphasize patient outcomes will receive
good pays. Given that reforming the medical education
system takes a longer time (may be a generation) than
reforming payment system (e.g., a few years), a viable
policy option for China in the short run is to mitigate the
efficiency loss in health care market through the payment
system reform.
Conclusion
Like the Flexner Report over a century ago, this study
pointed out one thing in common between two coun-
tries across the history of 100 years, which is featured by
too many medical schools established and too many
“doctors” trained, with significantly different admission
and graduation standards. This paper reviews the histor-
ical background of multi-tiered medical education in
China and investigates its impact on the performance of
health care market. Although the multi-tiered medical
education system enjoyed the benefits of training doc-
tors in a quick way, it also pays the price to lower the
overall quality of physician training and further the qual-
ity of health care. Previous literature has paid more
attention on the contribution of low-quality physicians
in achieving the remarkable public health gain, such as
the legend of barefoot doctors in rural China. By con-
trast, there is no virtual study to pay attention on the
cost of such multi-tiered education system to the mod-
ern society in China.
The contribution of our paper is to fill the literature
gap by providing the quantitative evidence on the cost
side of the multi-tiered medical education system. Based
on both national aggregate statistics and provincial
survey data, we find evidence that high-quality physi-
cians (in terms of higher education attainment) are more
likely to concentrate in urban areas and in largerhospitals, which in turn create significant negative im-
pacts on the performance of health care sector in China.
On the one hand, the unequal distribution of high-
quality physicians between urban and rural areas ampli-
fies the regional inequality in the access to high-quality
care in China. On the other hand, the unequal distribu-
tion of high-quality physicians across health institution
also contributes to the formation of hospital-centered
health care system, which in turn imposes various types
of efficiency loss to the health care market in China,
including a higher time costs of accessing health care
services and lower trust relationship between physicians
and their patients.
Our analysis also indicates that the multi-tiered med-
ical education system will not phase out in the near
future. As a result, it is important to find effective policy
options to mitigate the social costs imposed by the
multi-tiered medical education system. Our paper high-
lights two important policy tools in addressing the
equity and efficiency issues arising from multi-tiered
medical education. The first option is to use information
and communication technologies to integrate high- and
low-quality physicians into a learning network. The
second option is the payment system reform to shift the
mechanism of rewarding physicians from volume-based
to value-based. Both policy tools have sound theoretical
rationales and empirical evidence, but more studies are
needed for the implementation of these two policies.
There are also recommendations for future studies; it is
important to extend our perspectives on the impacts of
heterogeneity in medical education on the health care
market to other countries, especially those developing
countries where the governments hope to modernize the
health care markets.
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